Ordered Search in Differentiated Markets by Jidong Zhou
EERI
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute 
EERI Research Paper Series No 28/2009 
ISSN: 2031-4892 
Copyright © 2009 by Jidong Zhou 
Ordered Search in Dierentiated Markets 
Jidong Zhou 
EERI
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute 
Avenue de Beaulieu 
1160 Brussels 
Belgium
Tel: +322 299 3523 
Fax: +322 299 3523 
www.eeri.euOrdered Search in Di erentiated Markets 
Jidong Zhou
Department of Economics, University College London
This Version: August 2009
Abstract
This note presents an ordered search model in which consumers search both
for price and product  tness. We construct an equilibrium in which there is price
dispersion and prices rise in the order of search. The top  rms in consumer search
process, though charge lower prices, earn higher pro ts due to their larger market
shares.
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JEL classi cation: D43, D83, L13
1 Introduction
In a variety of circumstances, consumers need to search to  nd a satisfactory product.
However, not as most of the search literature assumes, the order in which consumers search
through alternatives is often not random. For example, when facing options presented in
a list such as links on a search engine webpage and dishes on a menu, people often consider
them from the top down; when shopping in a high street, a bazaar, or a supermarket,
consumers’ search order is restricted by the spatial locations of sellers or products; when
we go to a travel agent to buy airline tickets or a  nancial advisor to buy a savings
product, the advisor may tell us the options one by one in a predetermined order.
This note intends to investigate how non-random consumer search can a ect  rms’
pricing behavior. We study an ordered search model with horizontally di erentiated
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1products where consumers search both for price and product  tness in an exogenously
given order. We show that, when there are no systematic quality di erences between
products and the search cost is homogenous among consumers, there is an equilibrium in
which prices rise with the rank of products. This is essentially because if a consumer visits
 rms positioned down in her search order, she must have relatively low valuations for early
products, which provides later  rms extra monopoly power. In such an equilibrium with
a rising price sequence, it is indeed rational for consumers to follow the order in which
products are presented.1 Therefore, even if consumers can control their search orders
freely, ordered search can emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
We also show that the top  rms in consumer search process, though charge lower
prices, earn higher pro ts due to their larger market shares. This supports the fact that
 rms are willing to pay for top positions. For instance, manufacturers pay supermarkets
for access to prominent positions;  rms bid for sponsored links on search engines; and
sellers pay more for salient advert slots in yellow page directories.
Arbatskaya (2007) has studied an ordered search model where  rms supply a homo-
geneous product. Since consumers only care about price, in equilibrium the price should
decline with the rank of products, otherwise no rational consumer would have an incentive
to sample products in unfavorable positions.2 In our model with di erentiated products,
consumers may search on in pursuit of better matched products even if they expect rising
prices. Then their search history reveals their preferences, which can signi cantly change
 rms’ pricing incentive.
The search model with di erentiated products is initiated by Wolinsky (1986) and fur-
ther developed by Anderson and Renault (1999). Both papers consider random consumer
search. More recently, Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) (AVZ thereafter) use that
framework to model prominence, in which all consumers sample a prominent product  rst
and, if it is not satisfactory, they will continue to search randomly among other products.3
1There are other possible reasons why consumers are willing to follow the presentation order. For
example, the products in top positions may have higher qualities. See more discussion in the conclusion
part.
2An earlier paper on ordered consumer search is Perry and Wigderson (1986). There is two-sided
asymmetric information in their model: the product is homogenous but each seller has an uncertain
cost, and consumers di er in their willingness-to-pay for the product. They also assume no scope for
going back to a previous o er. They argue that in equilibrium the observed prices, on average, could be
non-monotonic in the order of sellers.
3Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) construct a related empirical non-random search model, where in-
vestors sample di erentiated mutual funds with unequal probabilities. But they did not explore theoret-
ical predictions of their model, and there is also no empirical conclusion about the relationship between
2One main result in AVZ is that the prominent product will be cheaper than others. This
note generalizes AVZ by considering a completely ordered search model and obtains a
similar result. However, the analysis in AVZ cannot be straightforwardly applied when-
ever there are more than two  rms. The consumer stopping rule in AVZ is stationary
since all non-prominent  rms charge the same price, while in this note given that di erent
 rms charge di erent prices, the consumer stopping rule becomes non-stationary. This
causes extra complication in the analysis and calls for new techniques in proving existence
of equilibrium and the pro t result. In addition, the stopping rule in the ordered search
model crucially depends on the rank of prices. For example, the stopping rule associated
with a rising price sequence is qualitatively di erent from that associated with a declining
price sequence. Hence, we need to deal with the issue of multiple equilibria, which is
absent is AVZ. We rule out the possibility of equilibrium with a declining price sequence.
In the three- rm case, we can also rule out equilibria with non-monotonic price sequences.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and it
is analyzed in section 3. Section 4 concludes and discusses possible extensions. Technical
proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 A Model of Ordered Search
Our underlying model of consumer choice is based on the framework developed by Wolin-
sky (1986). There are    2  rms indexed by 12···, each supplying a single product
at a constant unit cost which we normalize to zero. There are a large number of consumers
with measure of one, and each consumer has a unit demand for one product. Consumers
have idiosyncratic valuations of products. Speci cally, (1 2 ··· ) a r et h ev a l u e sa t -
tached by a consumer to di erent products, where  is assumed to be independently
drawn from a common distribution () on [min max] which has a positive and di eren-
tiable density function (); and all match values are also realized independently across
consumers. The common-distribution assumption means that there are no systematic
quality di erences among products. The surplus from buying one unit of  rm ’s product
at price  is    . If all match utilities and prices are known, a consumer will choose
the product providing the highest positive surplus. If     	 0 for all , she will leave
the market without buying anything.
We assume that consumers initially have imperfect information about the product
prices and the match utilities (but they hold the rational expectation). They can gather
sampling probability and price.
3information through a sequential search process. By incurring a search cost 
0,a
consumer can  nd out a product’s price and match utility. We assume that the search
process is without replacement and there is costless recall (i.e., a consumer can return
to any previously sampled product without paying an extra cost). Departing from the
traditional search literature, we suppose that all consumers sample  rms in an exogenously
speci ed order. Without loss of generality,  rm  will be sampled before  rm  +1 .
Firms know their own positions in consumers’ search process. They simultaneously
set prices  ( =1 2···) to maximize pro t based on their expectations of consumer
behavior.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Demand
We  rst analyze consumers’ search behavior. Let  solve
Z max

(   )()=
 (1)
If there are no price di erences among products and if a consumer has found a product
with match value , the bene t from sampling one more product (the left-hand side) is
equal to the search cost. As long as the search cost is not too high,  exists uniquely and
decreases with 
. Throughout this paper, we assume the search cost is relatively small
such that in equilibrium  	for all  and so each  rm has a chance to be sampled by
consumers.45
The form of consumers’ optimal stopping rule depends on the property of the price
sequence in their expectation. Since we aim to construct an equilibrium with 1 	 2 	
···	  	 , we  rst assume that consumers hold an expectation of an increasing price
sequence. We will discuss the issue of multiple equilibria in Section 3.3.6
4When a consumer expects 1  , her expected surplus from sampling product 1 is
R max
1 (  
1)()   	0 and so she is willing to participate in the market. Similarly, when a consumer expects
+1  , there is a positive probability that she will further sample product 
 +1after sampling the
 rst 
 products. Therefore,  for all 
 ensures that every  rm is active in the market.
5As usual in search models, there are always uninteresting equilibria where consumers only sample
the  rst 
    1 products, because they expect that other  rms are charging very high prices such that
visiting them is not worthwhile at all. Since they do not expect consumers to visit them, those  rms
have no incentive to lower their prices. We do not consider these equilibria further.
6T h e r ei sn os u c ha ni s s u ew h e n =2or when consumers sample randomly among all other  rms
after visiting  rm 1 as in AVZ.
4The Optimal Stopping Rule. Suppose consumers expect an increasing price sequence

1 	 
2 	 ··· 	 
 	 . Then the optimal stopping rule is characterized by a
sequence of decreasing cuto  reservation surplus levels 1  2  ···  1,w h e r e
    
+1. That is, if a consumer has already sampled     1  rms,s h ew i l l
search on if the maximum available surplus so far    max{0 1 1···  }
is less than ; otherwise she will stop searching and buy the best product so far. If
a consumer has sampled all products, she will either buy the best one with positive
surplus, or leave the market without buying anything.
The optimal stopping rule appears to be “myopic” because at each  rm       1
consumers behave as if there were only one  rm left unsampled. We prove it by means of
backward induction. When a consumer has already sampled  1 products, according to
the de nition of  in (1) she should sample the last product if and only if the maximum
surplus so far is less than  =  
. Now make the inductive assumption and consider
the situation when she has already sampled       2 products. If  is less than
 =    
+1, then sampling product  +1is always worthwhile. If  is greater than
, expecting that she will stop searching whatever surplus she discovers at the next  rm
(because of +1       +1 and the inductive assumption), she should actually
cease her search now.
This stopping rule also indicates that consumers become more reluctant to keep search-
ing when the search process goes on. This is because they expect increasing prices, not
because of fewer options left unsampled. In e ect, if consumers expect that all  rms are
charging the same price , their optimal stopping rule will be stationary with  =    .
We now derive demand functions. We claim that  rm ’s demand when it charges 
is





( 1 + )












(For this demand function to be valid for every ,w eu s e0 =    
1,  =0 ,a n d
Q
 0 =1 .)
This demand function can be understood as follows. A consumer will come to  rm
 if she does not stop at any of the  rst    1  rms (i.e., if 	 	 	 for all      
51). This condition is equivalent to  1 	  1, because 	 increases weakly while 	
decreases. Hence, the probability that a consumer visits  rm  is Pr( 1 	  1)=.
(In particular, 1 =1since all consumers sample product 1  rst.) This consumer will buy
at  rm  immediately if she  nds that      1.T h i si sb e c a u s et h e n    1  
and so she will stop searching, and at the same time      1   1 and so product
 is better than all previous products. The probability of this event is 1   ( 1 + ).
This explains the  rst term in (2). It is illustrated as (a) in Figure 1 below.
If a consumer at  rm   nds that       [  1), she will not search on either.
However, she will now buy product  only if it is better than each previous product.
(That is,  rm  is now competing with all  rms positioned before it but none of those
positioned after it.) The (unconditional) probability of this whole event is


















where the second equality is from changing the integral variable from  to  =    .
This explains the  rst term in , and we illustrate it as (b) in Figure 1.
If a consumer at  rm   nds that       [+1 ),  r m has demand only if
 1 is also less than . (Otherwise, product  is dominated at least by some previous
product.) Conditional on that, the consumer will continue to sample product  +1but
none of further ones. She will come back to buy product  if it is the best one among the
 rst +1products. (Now  rm  is competing not only with all  rms positioned before it
but also with one  rm positioned after it). The (unconditional) probability of this whole
event is


















where the second equality is again from changing the integral variable. This explains the
second term in , and we illustrate it as (c) in Figure 1. Notice that this portion of
demand is from consumers who return without sampling all  rms. This kind of “midway
returning consumers” are absent in the random search model such as Wolinsky (1986) or
6the prominence model with only one prominent  rm such as AVZ. In both models, the
stopping rule is stationary and consumers will return only if they have sampled all  rms.
In general, the term indexed by  in  is  rm ’s demand when       [	 	 1).
    +1   +1
-
if  1 	  1
-
if  	 




(a) buy at 
(b) buy among 1 to 
(c) buy among 1 to  +1
if also  1 	 
. . .
Figure 1: Consumer Decision at Firm 
Following the terminology in AVZ (though not precisely), we call the  rst portion
of demand in (2) the “fresh demand” and the second portion of demand (i.e., )t h e
“returning demand”. (The  rst term in  is from the consumers who stop searching at
 rm  rather than from returning consumers. In addition, for the last  rm, there are no
returning consumers literally. We decompose the demand in such a way simply according
to the similarity of price sensitivity.) Notice that  is independent of  rm ’s actual price.
This is because whether a consumer will visit  rm  is only a ected her expectation of
. Also notice that a  rm’s price a ects its returning demand only through the density
function . In particular, for the uniform distribution, a  rm’s returning demand is
independent of its actual price, and so is less price responsive than fresh demand. When
a  rm increases its price, more consumes will search on, which implies a larger number
of potential returning consumers. (In the  rst term in , more consumers will compare
it with previous  rms.) At the same time, this  rm is less likely to win them back in
competing with other  rms. In the uniform setting, these two e ects just cancel out each
other.
3.2 Equilibrium prices and pro ts
The above demand analysis is predicated on that consumers hold an expectation of in-
creasing prices. We now show that 1 	 2 	 ···	  	is indeed an equilibrium. For
tractability, from now on we focus on the case with the uniform distribution on [01] (i.e.,
7 ()=). Then  de ned in (1) equals 1 
 
2
. To ensure the existence of equilibrium
with  	for all  (i.e., every  rm is active), we assume that the search cost is relatively
small:

   (018) or    (121) (3)
In the uniform case, as both  and  a r ei n d e p e n d e n to f  r m’s actual price ,
pro t maximization yields the  rst-order condition:7















Using the fact that consumers’ expectation is ful lled in equilibrium (i.e.,  1 =  ),
we have




Since (1 ) is  rm ’s fresh demand in equilibrium,  is proportional to the ratio of
returning demand to fresh demand. Then (5) implies that a  rm whose demand consists of
more returning demand proportionally will charge a higher price. This is consistent with
the observation that the returning demand is less price sensitive than the fresh demand.
It is clear that  rm  h a sm o r ef r e s hd e m a n dt h a n  r m +1(i.e.,   +1), but it can
also be shown that it has more returning demand (i.e.,   +1). Hence, it is ap r i o r i
unclear whether  	 +1 or not.
Although it is infeasible to solve the system of the  rst-order conditions analytically,
w ec a ns h o wt h a ti td o e sh a v eas o l u t i o nw i t has e q u e n c eo fi n c r e a s i n gp r i c e s . 8 (All
omitted proofs are included in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1 In the uniform-distribution case with condition (3), our ordered search
model has an equilibrium with
1   	 1 	 2 	 ···	  	 12
7In the uniform-distribution setting, the  rst-order condition is su cient for no local pro table devi-
ations. However, if  rm 
 deviates to a too high price ( 	 1   1), its fresh demand will become
zero and its returning demand will become price dependent. This may make the pro t function no longer
globally concave. However, as in AVZ, we can show that the pro t function is still quasi-concave, and so
the  rst-order condition is also su cient for no global deviations.
8We have not developed a proof for uniqueness, but numerical simulations suggest that, under con-
dition (3), within the region of [01] the system of  rst-order conditions (5) has a unique solution in
(1   12)
.
8This result implies that in equilibrium  rm  has more fresh demand proportionally
than  rm  +1 , and so its demand is more price sensitive. We can also understand
this result from the following perspective: the last  rm knows that the consumers who
w e n tt h r o u g ha l lt h es a m p l i n gu pt ot h i sp o i n ta r r i v eo n l yb e c a u s et h e yd i dn o t  n d
well-matched products before, and it also knows that these consumers do not face any
unsampled options. So it has signi cant monopoly power over them. Earlier  rms on
the other hand have an incentive to reduce the price because they want to prevent the
consumers from further sampling. The graph below depicts how equilibrium prices vary
with the parameter  when there are three  rms, where the three curves from the bottom
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Prices and  ( =3 )
Several polar cases deserve mention: (i) When the search cost tends to zero (i.e., when
 tends to one), consumers sample all  rms before they purchase, and so all prices will
converge to the full-information equilibrium price ¯ ,s a y ,w h i c hs a t i s   e s¯  =1  ¯ .( T h i s
formula is obtained from (5) by letting  =1 .) (ii) When the search cost is su ciently
high such that    12, all prices will converge to the monopoly price 12.T h i si sb e c a u s e
consumers now stop searching whenever they  nd a product with positive surplus, and
so each  rm acts as a monopolist. (iii) When there are a large number of  rms in the
market (i.e., when     ) ,a l lp r i c e sw i l lc o n v e r g et o1   .10 This is because with
in nitely many  rms, from each  rm onward the problem looks the same (except that
the mass of consumers is shrinking, but that does not matter since how many consumers
9We expect our price result to hold even for more general distributions so long as the fresh demand is
more price sensitive than the returning demand. From the expression for  in (2), we can see that this
is true at least when the density function increases or does not decrease too fast.
10We only need to show  =1   + 






¢1 , and the latter tends to zero as     .
9will visit a  rm is independent of its actual price). Thus, all  rms o er the same price
and consumers never exercise their recall option. These polar cases suggest that the price
dispersion caused by non-random consumer search is most pronounced when the search
cost is at an intermediate level and the number of  rms is not too large.
In equilibrium,  rm  has a larger demand than  rm  +1(since both   +1 and
  +1 hold), but it charges a lower price. Hence, it is ap r i o r iunclear whether  rm 
e a r n sm o r eo rl e s st h a n  r m +1 .L e t be  rm ’s equilibrium pro t. The following
result indicates that the demand e ect dominates.
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium with a sequence of rising prices,  rm 1 earns more than
 rm 2, and for    2,  r m earns more than  rm  +1at least when 	 ( +1 ) .
Though we only derive a su cient condition for   +1 with    2,n u m e r i c a l
simulations suggest that it is true for any    (121). The following graph depicts how
pro ts vary with the parameter  when there are three  rms, where the curves from the












0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 a
Figure 3: Equilibrium Pro ts and  ( =3 )
This example also shows that in an ordered search market  rms positioned relatively
down in consumer search process can bene t from the reduction of search cost. When the
search cost becomes smaller (i.e., when  increases), the market share redistribution e ect
due to the restricted search order is weakened, which harms top  rms but bene ts  rms
in unfavorable positions. At the same time, a smaller search cost implies more intense
price competition, which harms all  rms. The combination of these two e ects explains
why 1 decreases while 2 and 3 vary non-monotonically with .
103.3 Are there other equilibria?
Consumers’ optimal stopping rule depends on their expectation of the price sequence in
the market, and it in turn a ects  rms’ pricing decisions. In equilibrium, the consumer
belief should be consistent with the actual prices. Our analysis so far has shown that an
equilibrium with a rising price sequence exists. Nevertheless, we have not yet discussed
other possible equilibria. We  rst consider the possibility of an equilibrium with a declin-
ing price sequence (as in Arbatskaya, 2007). We still focus on the uniform-distribution
setting.
Suppose there is an equilibrium in which consumers hold an expectation of 
1   
2  
··· 
 (but their search order is still restricted) and every  rm is active. According to
Kohn and Shavell (1974), consumers’ optimal stopping rule is well de ned and character-
ized by a sequence of cuto  reservation surplus levels (1···  1). That is, a consumer
at  rm     1 will continue to search if and only if the maximum surplus so far is less
than .W ec a ns h o wt h a t1  ···  1 =  
 with     
+1 for all     2.11
So consumers will become more willing to search on as the search process goes on. This
is qualitatively di erent from the stopping rule when consumers expect a rising price
sequence. (To have a uni ed expression for demand functions, we use  =    
.)
Now we derive demand functions. A consumer will visit  rm  if and only if 	 	 	 	
for all       1. If she  nds out       , she will stop searching and buy product
 since it is better than all previous products (due to the increasing 	). If she  nds out
  	 , she will continue to search, and will eventually return to buy at  rm  if she
has sampled all products (again due to the increasing 	) and product  has the highest
positive surplus. Hence,  rm ’s demand is
 ()=P r ( 	   	 	 	 for       1 and       )
+Pr(	   	 	 	 for       1 and max{ 1    } +1 	     	 )
=  [1   ( + )] + 
where  =
Q
	  1 (	 + 	) is the number of consumers who visit  rm ,a n d represents
the number of returning consumers. (Notice that, due to the increasing cuto  reservation
11Keep the notation    max{0 1   1···    }. First of all, at  rm    1, 1 =    	

is simply from the de nition of . Now consider a consumer at  rm    2.I f 2   	
1,t h e n
sampling product  1 is always worthwhile. If 2   1, this consumer will never sample  rm  no
matter what surplus she discovers at  rm  1, and so she has no incentive to just visit  rm  1 since
2   1 =  	
    	
1. Thus, the cuto  reservation surplus level at  rm  2, 1,m u s tb e
between    	
1 and 1. The same logic can go backward further to explain the stopping rule.
11surplus levels, there are now no midway returning consumers any more.) Two observations
are useful: (i) in our uniform setting,  is again independent of  rm ’s actual price ;
(ii)    +1. The latter is because, if a consumer has left both  rm  and  rm  +1 ,
the former’s product must on average have a lower net surplus given    +1,a n ds oi t
can win this consumer back less likely.
Due to the restricted search order,  rm  tends to have more fresh demand than  rm
 +1 .A t t h e s a m e t i m e ,   r m  has less returning demand than  rm  +1 .S i n c e t h e
fresh demand is again more price sensitive than the returning demand,  rm  will have
an incentive to charge a lower price. This leads to a contradiction. We formalize this
argument in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 In the uniform-distribution case, our ordered search model has no equi-
librium in which all  rms are active and they charge declining prices 1   2  ··· .
Since 1 does not a ect consumers’ stopping rule once they participate in the market,
our analysis also implies that, when    3, there is no equilibrium with 1 	 2  ··· 
.12 However, it is di cult to further rule out the possibility of other equilibria with
non-monotonic price sequences. This is mainly because for di erent non-monotonic price
sequences, consumers’ optimal stopping rule usually has di erent properties. So it is hard
to discuss all hypothetical non-monotonic equilibria in a uni ed way. However, in the
three- rm case, we can show that there is no non-monotonic equilibrium. In that case,
the only remaining case we need to deal with is 1   2 	 3.S i n c e1 does not a ect the
stopping rule, our analysis for a rising price sequence applies. The discussion in footnote
8 suggests that, under the condition 
   (018), 1   2 cannot take place together with
2 	 3.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented an ordered search model with di erentiated products in which
consumers search both for price and product  tness. We have constructed an equilibrium
in which there is price dispersion and prices rise in the order of search. The top  rms
in consumer search process, though charge lower prices, earn higher pro ts due to their
larger market shares. We also ruled out the possibility of equilibrium with a declining
price sequence.
12If  =2 , one can see that our proof of Proposition 3 does not work for 1  2.
12Our analysis is restricted to the case where all consumers have the same search cost.
If consumers have heterogenous search costs (as in Arbatskaya, 2007), those with higher
search costs are more likely to buy at the top  rms, which provides the top  rms an
incentive to charge higher prices. If there is no product di erentiation, as Arbatskaya
(2007) has shown, prices should then decline with the rank of  rms. With product di er-
entiation, however, this e ect should be balanced with the opposite one identi ed in this
paper. The  nal prediction will depend on the relative importance of the two e ects.
We have also restricted our attention to the case with an exogenous search order.
However, our equilibrium still survives even if we allow consumers to choose their search
orders freely. This is because in our model products in top positions are cheaper than
others and so it is rational to sample them  rst.13 Alternatively, we could also endogenize
consumer search order through, for example, advertising competition or bidding for online
paid placements. Hann and Moraga-Gonzalez (2009) consider a similar search model with
di erentiated products in which a consumer’s likelihood of sampling a  rm is proportional
to that  rm’s advertising intensity. But in symmetric equilibrium, all  rms set the same
price and advertise with the same intensity, and consumers end up searching randomly.
They also constructed a non-random search equilibrium in the duopoly case by introduc-
ing asymmetric advertising technologies among  rms. Chen and He (2006), and Athey
and Ellison (2008) present two auction models in which advertisers bid for sponsor-link
positions on a search engine. Distinct from other papers on position auctions, they have a
formal search model in the consumer side. In equilibrium, consumers search through the
sponsor links in the order presented since they anticipate that high-quality links will be
placed higher up the listing, and higher-quality  rms do have a greater incentive to buy
top positions given consumers’ search order. But there is no e ective price competition
in both papers, and so no role for non-random consumer search to a ect market prices.14
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We will  rst show that, in the uniform setting, under the condition    (121) our
ordered search model has an equilibrium with 1    1  ···    12. We will then
13With a free choice of search order, random search with a uniform price across  rms will also become
an equilibrium outcome.
14Chen and He (2006) do have prices charged by advertisers, but the structure of consumer demand in
their model means that the Diamond Paradox is present, and all  rms set monopoly prices.
13exclude the possibility of equalities.
Suppose consumers hold an expectation of p =( 
1··· 
) with 1      
1  ··· 

   12. Given other  rms’ prices  , the demand function of  rm  is















More precisely, since we are using uniform distribution on [01], every term ( + ) in 
and  should be replaced by min{1+}.N o t i c et h a tb o t h and  are independent
of  rm ’s actual price , and so we can write the  rst-order condition as15




Step 1: Given , the system of (6) for  =1 ···has a solution with
 =  (p
)   [1   12],  =1 ···
Equation (6) de nes the best response of  to other prices  , which we denote
 =  ( ;p). First, from 2   1  1 =1 +
   2(1  ),w eh a v e   1 .
Second, since 	 decreases and  =0 ,w eh a v e
   
 X
	=
(	 1   	)= 1
and so (6) implies    12. Hence, given p we have a continuous mapping
b(p;p
)=[ 1 ( 1;p
)···  ( ;p
)]
from [1   12]
 to itself. The Brouwer  xed-point theorem yields our result. The
implicit function theorem also implies that  (p) are continuous functions.
Step 2: Given ,w eh a v e+1 (p)    (p).
From (6), we have






   1    +
1

(+1   )
15Some readers may wonder why we do not directly deal with the  rst-order conditions in (5) (which
have used the belief consistency condition). It turns out to be technically more di cult.
14where the inequality is because    +1. (The equality holds if both of them equal to




















  (   +1)   ( 1   )
Therefore,
2(+1   )  


(   +1)
which implies +1      0.
Step 3: The above analysis implies that, for any consumer expectation p in the
domain of  ={p   [1   12]
 : 1  ··· } (which is compact and convex), the
price competition has an equilibrium  (p)=[ 1(p)··· (p)] which also lies in  .
Moreover,  (p) in continuous in  . Thus, the Brouwer  xed-point theorem implies that
our ordered search model has an equilibrium in  .
Step 4: We now exclude the equality possibility. First, given    12, in equilibrium
 1 =    0 under the condition    (121).A l s or e c a l lt h a tw eu s e =0 .T h u s ,







( + ) 	  (   )
So equation (5) for  =  implies  	 12. Finally, given the equilibrium price p    
and the condition    (121),  is strictly greater than +1. Then, a similar argument
as in Step 2 implies +1  .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Notice that   +1(+1) since  rm  can at least charge the same price as  rm
 +1 . Thus, it su ces to show (+1)  +1(+1),o r
(1    +    +1)+  +1(1   )++1 (7)
(Due to the higher cuto  reservation surplus level at  rm , it may now have less fresh







15is the  rst term in  and  includes all other terms. It is ready to see   +1 since
 	 +1.
For  =1 , we further have  = (+1 ), and so (7) holds since   +1.T h a t
i s ,  r m1m u s te a r nm o r et h a n  r m2 .
For    2,w eh a v e
  (+1   )
Q
  1
(   +1 + )  (+1   )+1
and so (7) holds if ( +1)[1     (+1   )]  0,o re q u i v a l e n t l y+1  	 1 .
A looser su cient condition is +1+1 	 1    by using (5). Moreover, we know that
















we obtain the su cient condition 	 ( +1 ) .
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
We continue our argument in Section 3.3. Given the demand functions derived under
consumers’ expectation of a declining price sequence, pro t maximization yields the  rst-
order conditions:
 (1      2)+ =0
for all . In particular, for  rm  we have
 (1      )+ =0 (9)
by using  =     in equilibrium, and so 1       	 0.I f1  ··· , then the
 rst-order condition for any  rm       1 implies
0= (1      2)+    (1      )+ 	  (1      )+
where the  rst inequality is because     +1    , and the second one is because
   ,    and    . This, however, contradicts to (9).
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